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Introduction 
Principal–agent theory and research policy:  
an introduction 
Dietmar Braun and David H Guston 
The rational choice perspective is prominent in 
many sociological, economic and political sci-
ence literature but has been undervalued until 
now in the field of science studies. This special 
issue attempts to revalorise this perspective by 
introducing the principal–agent theory with rela-
tion to research policy-making. The introduction 
presents the basic features of the model of prin-
cipal–agent and reviews the theoretical develop-
ment and applications in research policy. It 
summarises the main findings of the articles in 
this issue and concludes that the studies in the 
framework of principal–agent demonstrate the 
willingness of combining theoretical rigour and 
‘requisite variety’ by applying the theory to a 












LTHOUGH THEY HAVE never played a 
prominent role in the sociology of science  
or political science literature, studies on  
research policy-making have a long tradition. Fur-
thermore, it must be stated that a common theoreti-
cal framework has been lacking. The field is, as 
David Guston (1996) noticed, heavily “under-
theorised”. It would be wrong, however, to assume 
that there were no attempts in the past to learn  
lessons about research policies on the base of vari-
ous theoretical approaches. Though a systematic and 
historical overview is lacking, we can discern  
perhaps five theoretical currents that have influenced 
in some way the thinking on research policies: 
• Economics, both classical (Polanyi, 1951; 1962; 
Tullock, 1966; Ghiselin, 1987; Foray, 2000) and 
Marxist (Bourdieu, 1975; Bourdieu, 2001); 
• System-theory (Krohn and Küppers, 1987; 
Luhmann, 1990); 
• Constructivism (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr 
et al, 1981; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour, 1987); 
• Institutionalism (Merton, 1970 [1938]; Ben-
David, 1971; 1991; 1991 [1977]; Mukerji, 1989; 
Mayntz, 1991); 
• Discussion on the “finalization of science” 
(Daehle, 1979; Weingart, 1997). 
This introduction is not the place to assess the con-
tribution of each approach to our present knowledge 
on research policies. We generally believe, however, 
that these approaches are either too abstract (system-
theory), lacking in parsimony or theoretical rigour 
(constructivism, institutionalism, finalization) or, if 
they are parsimonious (like classical economics), 
that they abstract too greatly from the ‘requisite va-
riety’ of real life. 
A
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What we need instead, is an intelligent combina-
tion of analytical and rigorous tools, of “parsimony, 
refinement, and (in the sense used by mathemati-
cians) elegance” (Bates et al, 1998, page 11). Such 
tools will be useful for interpreting research policies 
with attention to the historical and institutional con-
texts in which research policy is made, something 
we find for example in the concept of “analytic  
narratives” developed by Bates et al (1998). 
The analytic tool most useful for this purpose 
seems to us to be principal–agent theory, which has 
been developed in the context of rational choice and 
transaction cost theory (see, for example, Ross, 
1973; Williamson, 1975; 1985; Coleman, 1990; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). In the early 1990s, 
Braun (1993) introduced the concept in the context 
of research policy-making (see below), most notably 
by referring to the relationship between policy-
makers as the principal and the various funding 
agencies responsible for the implementation of re-
search policy as the agents. This relationship seemed 
to correspond perfectly to the basic logic of princi-
pal–agent figurations, that is, one actor who seeks 
“extension of self” (Coleman, 1990, page 146) by 
delegating some tasks for execution by other actors 
who seem better capable to do so. 
Funding agencies were, since their origins, 
designed to work out and implement research poli-
cies, in preference to the usual public bureaucracy 
that lacked the necessary direct contacts with sci-
ence. The concept is, however, more general and 
can, as will be shown in this special issue, be applied 
to relations between policy-makers and scientists in 
general, between the funding administration and sci-
entists, or between funding programme directors and 
scientists. 
Principal–agent theory is becoming a predominant 
approach in different fields of political science 
where ‘delegation’ as one particular form of organis-
ing state activities is discussed. This predominance 
holds for studies of delegation to bureaucracy by 
Congress (McCubbins, 1984; Weingast, 1984), 
delegation to “independent regulatory agencies” 
(Majone, 2001a) and central banks (Majone, 2001b; 
Elgie, 2002), as well as of all relations in the “de-
mocratic chain of delegation” from the voter to the 
implementing bureaucracy (Strom, 2000). Given the 
extant literature on principal–agent theory in re-
search policy, we consider it appropriate to demon-
strate the usefulness of the approach in this policy 
field and to further elaborate the concept. 
We want, first, to briefly introduce the reader to 
the basics of principal–agent ideas before we then 
present the findings on research policy in the litera-
ture. Finally, we will give an overview of the main 
themes discussed in this special issue. 
Basics of principal–agent theory 
The principal–agent literature deals with a specific 
social relationship, that is, delegation, in which two 
actors are involved in an exchange of resources. The 
principal is the actor who disposes of a number of 
resources but “not those of the appropriate kind to 
realize the interests (for example, has money but not 
the appropriate skills)” (Coleman, 1990, page 146). 
He or she then needs the agent, who accepts these 
appropriate resources and is willing to further the 
interests of the principal. In this sense, Coleman is 
right to speak of an “extension of self” of the princi-
pal by way of delegation. 
The principal–agent model has been developed 
within the framework of the “new institutional  
economics” (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Moe, 1984; 
Miller, 1992) and therefore shares the basic charac-
teristics of this framework, for instance, the assump-
tion of rational actors striving to maximise their 
preferences that are ordered according to their priori-
ties. Institutions can constrain actors’ choices so that 
the conscious design of institutions (like contracts) 
may help to overcome typical collective action prob-
lems involved in the principal–agent relationship. 
There are two typical collective action problems 
discussed in the literature — moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. These problems are based on what 
the new institutional economics calls the ‘opportun-
ism’ of actors: Actors are self-interested and thus 
seek to maximise their personal welfare. They may 
do this by seeking their self-interest “with guile. 
This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant 
forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating” (Wil-
liamson, 1985, page 47). 
In the particular case of principal–agent relations, 
such ‘cheating’ or, as is often said, ‘shirking’ by the 
agent may happen because the agent usually has an 
informational advantage vis-à-vis the principal. The 
principal does not know for sure if the agent will 
really do his or her best when delegated certain tasks 
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(this is the “moral hazard”), and usually the principal 
does not have sufficient information on the abilities 
of potential agents to find the one best suited to do 
the task (this is “adverse selection”). 
As agents seek their self-interest with guile, they 
may hide this information from the principal to re-
duce their work load or to be hired in the first place. 
The resulting delegation could then be sub-optimal 
or even detrimental to what the principal attempted 
to achieve. This is why the principal–agent literature 
(discussing the problems of insurance agencies or of 
parliaments dealing with bureaucracies) discusses 
contract and monitoring mechanisms designed to 
avoid these problems. 
The collective action problems arise as both sides 
— the principal and the agent — have an interest in 
entering into the exchange relationship. They both 
profit by exchanging resources: the principal by get-
ting something done he or she could not otherwise 
do, and the agent because he or she gets remunera-
tion of some kind (money, social recognition, and so 
on). Despite these mutual advantages, the collective 
outcome may be suboptimal because, as is said, the 
agent has incentives to seek his self-interest with 
guile. 
We should also not forget the possibility of the 
principal to ‘shirk’, a possibility often not discussed 
in the literature. He or she may have incentives not 
to deliver the resources fully as agreed to in the con-
tract. Because of these co-operative and selfish mo-
tives characterising the relationship, principal–agent 
interaction is a ‘mixed-motive game’. 
The principal–agent literature discusses not only 
contract and monitoring mechanisms but also differ-
ent possible configurations and their influence on the 
shirking of agents. A configuration reducing the 
possibilities to shirk, for example, is the presence of 
multiple agents (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; 
Ferejohn, 1993), which creates more of a market-
like structure. The more advantageous configuration 
for the agents of multiple principals has been less 
often discussed (but see Elgie, 2002). 
Principal–agent theory enters science policy 
Principal–agent theory began to enter science policy 
in the 1990s. Guston (1996) wanted to use it to “re-
interpret” generic science policy problems. For him, 
“the problem of science policy is the problem of 
delegation” because lack of information on the side 
of “non-scientists” leads to the typical problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. This formula-
tion provides the opportunity to reflect about ade-
quate incentive structures to solve the main 
problems in science policy such as the integrity and 
productivity of research, or the choice between mis-
sion and disciplinary research. 
The main thrust of his paper was to make under-
stood that treating scientists as agents does not at all 
mean a hierarchical relationship. The autonomy of 
agents is widely respected in this relationship, and 
one should consider the relation between policy-
makers and scientists as a “two-way street” where a 
certain degree of autonomy is respected on both 
sides. 
Neither does Guston want to defend the usual 
normative stance of the principal–agent literature, 
which is to inform the principal about how best to 
design incentive structures. Principal–agent can be 
used for a variety of purposes and illuminate the ba-
sic tensions in the generic problems mentioned 
above, and it can be used to reflect in general on the 
“fairness” of the contracts defined between the prin-
cipal and the agent. 
Guston applied principal–agent theory to the  
relationship between non-scientists and scientists in 
general. Most of the other literature — and Guston 
(2000) joins them later — deals with a very specific 
feature of science policy, that is, the use of research 
councils and funding agencies that intermediate be-
tween policy-makers on the one hand and scientific 
agencies and scientists on the other hand. The intro-
duction of an intermediary level makes the discus-
sion more complex. The central question becomes: 
in what way can research councils be seen as agen-
cies that serve the interests of policy-makers? 
The introduction of research councils can, from a 
functionalist perspective, be explained by the prox-
imity of these agencies with the scientific field, more 
information on the field, and a greater capacity to 
aggregate the available knowledge. From an eco-
nomic perspective, the establishment of funding 
agencies can be explained by the decrease in transac-
tion costs for policy-makers in developing science 
policies. It seems, in addition, easier to influence 
such agencies that are either public or semi-public 
than to influence the scientists themselves because 
of the former’s direct dependence and constitutional 
commitments to work in the interests of policy-
makers. 
Principal–agent theory draws the attention of the 
observer immediately to the possibility of ‘shirking’ 
by research councils as agents. Since the beginning, 
however, contributions in science policy have  
explained such shirking not simply in terms of  
A configuration reducing the 
possibilities of agents shirking is the 
presence of multiple agents, which 
creates more of a market-like 
structure: the more advantageous 
configuration for the agents of 
multiple principals has been less often 
discussed 
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‘opportunistic’ behaviour but in relation to the inter-
action between funding agencies and scientists. 
Braun (1993) criticised the usual dyadic way of con-
ceptualising principal–agent relationships and of-
fered a theoretical account based on the “triadic 
relationship” among policy-makers, funding agen-
cies and scientists. 
His main argument is that funding agencies be-
come intimately interwoven with the “third party” 
— an under-developed concept in principal–agent 
theory but already mentioned in the work of  
Coleman (1990) — to fulfil the task delegated by the 
policy-maker principal. We could conceptualise the 
triadic relationship by designing two separate prin-
cipal–agent relationships, one between policy-
makers and the research council and one between the 
research council and scientists (see also Rip, 1994). 
Braun would find this too simple, however. 
First, scientists are certainly not simply agents of 
research councils but have a high degree of auton-
omy and influence on what is decided in research 
councils. The same holds for the relationship be-
tween policy-makers and research councils. We 
should rather speak of interdependent relationships 
in which both sides have something necessary to 
offer the other and a certain degree of autonomy is 
crucial for all actors in the game. This is, in fact, the 
“two way relationship” Rip and van der Meulen 
(1996) evoke, only that we now have two ‘two way 
relationships’. 
Second, each relationship is influenced by the 
way the relationship on the other side is organised. If 
funding agencies choose to ‘shirk’ in favour of the 
interests of scientists, this behaviour will have reper-
cussions for the strategies of principals to organise 
the principal–agent relationship with research coun-
cils. If policy-makers are using their formal author-
ity to oblige funding agencies to comply with 
political interests, this will have implications for the 
way scientists co-operate with research councils. In 
such dual interdependent relationships, research 
councils fare best when they are able to balance the 
often opposed interests of scientists and policy-
makers. Such balancing demands a considerable de-
gree of independence with respect to the principal 
and to the third party (see also Rip, 1994, page 13; 
Caswill, 1998). 
Both Rip and Braun underline, in addition, the 
historical and institutional context that is decisive for 
how the triadic relationship has evolved. There were 
times, especially during the “science-push period” 
after World War II, when scientific interests became 
predominant and research councils seemed to be 
‘captured’ by these interests. Today we seem to ex-
perience a period when research councils are more 
and more captured by political interests. Both peri-
ods have, or will, in the end, destabilise the triangle 
and will lead to increasing efforts of funding agen-
cies to find a new equilibrium. 
This idea of finding ‘stable equilibria’ in science 
policy principal–agent relationships was put forward 
in an analytical innovative way, by using game the-
ory (which has found some attention recently in 
principal–agent literature (Huber and Lupia, 2001)) 
by van der Meulen (1998). He does not deal with the 
triadic relationship but instead discusses the “basic” 
relationship between policy-makers and scientists. 
He demonstrates two things: first, that given the 
utility functions of both the principal and the agent 
and their options (the principal: to trust or to moni-
tor; the agent: to comply or not comply), the game 
does not find a stable Nash equilibrium. Each choice 
creates an incentive for at least one of the two actors 
to change the status quo. Nevertheless, and this is 
the second point, there are possibilities to find stable 
equilibria if we assume that, because of the interde-
pendency of actors, the relationship is a long-term 
one and the game can become co-operative. 
Van der Meulen sees four stabilising structures: 
the role of funding agencies, as discussed before, 
that can serve a balancing function; the mutual inter-
est of scientists and policy-makers in using peer re-
view; the emergence of a consensus on policy goals; 
and a competition among agents organised by the 
principal. For each structure, van der Meulen finds 
that scientists and policy-makers can develop an in-
terest in co-operation instead of opportunism. 
Finally, Guston (2000) also discusses stabilising 
arrangements in science policy, but finds them above 
all in the existence of “boundary organisations”. His 
reasoning is influenced by the constructivist litera-
ture that he sees as a useful corrective to the often 
“stylistic” assumption of principal–agent theory. 
Within the constructivist approach, “boundary” is a 
term developed by Gieryn (1995) to characterise the 
often fluid and ambiguous demarcations between 
scientific and non-scientific fields. 
Guston builds his boundary organisations on the 
notion of “boundary objects” that “allow members 
of different communities to work together around 
them, and yet maintain their disparate identities” 
(Guston, 2000, page 29). Boundary organisations 
can then be seen as situated between politics and 
science, both of which can be regarded as principals 
to the boundary organisations, and, “in doing so, [the 
boundary organisations] internalise the provisional 
and ambiguous character of that boundary”. They 
fulfil, therefore, exactly the stabilising function that 
van der Meulen ascribes to funding agencies, and 
which is also alluded to in the texts of Braun and 
Rip. 
Boundary organisations may also be of another 
kind: Guston (2000) treats the examples of the  
Office of Research Integrity and the Office of Tech-
nology Transfer in the United States. The most im-
portant point of his study is perhaps that he 
underlines — and this is the stabilising function of 
boundary organisations — the inherent capacity of 
these organisations to facilitate “co-production”, that 
is, the creation of both “knowledge and social order” 
or, in other terms, both scientific and political inter-
ests. Because boundary organisations internalise the 
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different logics of action, they can bridge different 
“worlds”. The result of his study confirms that in-
termediary organisations and boundary organisations 
are crucial to stabilise, according to the logic of 
principal–agent theory, the inherent unstable rela-
tionship of politics and science. 
The application of the principal–agent approach in 
this ‘first wave’ of science policy studies dem-
onstrates that the theory is not applied without  
reflection and modifications. The ‘field’, in particu-
lar the position of intermediary organisations, pro-
voked a more complex reflection, which led to the 
introduction of ‘triadic relationships’, ‘boundary 
organisations’, ‘equilibria in games’, and ‘dynamics 
in interdependent relationships’. 
Principal–agent in science policy today 
This special issue unites most of the authors who 
have participated in the ‘first wave’ of publications 
and adds some others. The articles presented here 
demonstrate the attempt to broaden the field of ap-
plication of principal–agent theory in science policy 
studies and brighten the interesting light this per-
spective can throw on the choices and procedures of 
science policy actors. 
Braun elaborates the existing insight that histori-
cal periods in the funding of science create different 
utility functions for both political principals and sci-
entific agents, which lead to various “games”. The 
different periods of science policy-making after 
World War II are interpreted from the angle of prin-
cipal–agent to see in what way the basic antinomy of 
funding policies (that is, the maintenance of the 
autonomy of scientists and the political interest to 
influence scientific action) is treated within these 
periods. His article ends by pointing to two different 
ways in today’s research policies of organising the 
principal–agent relationship, either in a market-
oriented way, which increases the moral hazard of 
scientists, or by funding inter-systemic networks, 
which seems to be a promising way to overcome the 
problem of moral hazard and monitoring costs in 
science policy. 
Van der Meulen takes up the classical issue of the 
role of funding agencies. He increases, however, the 
complexity of the configurations these agencies have 
to deal with because recent developments in science 
policy have shown that users are becoming a kind of 
“fourth party” in the principal–agent game. By using 
an empirical study of the Norwegian Research 
Council, which comprises all types of funding under 
one roof (but in different divisions), he looks for the 
strategies that different divisions develop given the 
various configurations of actors they are dealing 
with. He finds that differences with respect to the 
acceptance of strategic funding given the contacts 
and relationships with users are indeed quite impor-
tant. Actor constellations, understood as interde-
pendent and multiple relations, matter for what 
funding agencies are doing. Principal–agent rela-
tionships must therefore be understood in the light of 
these multiple and interdependent configurations, 
thus reinforcing Braun’s finding. 
Caswill takes seriously the idea of the contract 
that figures so prominently in principal–agent litera-
ture and embarks on a discussion of how the princi-
pal–agent relationship between funding agencies and 
scientists is organised by actual funding contracts. 
On the base of an exploratory, empirical study, he 
shows variations and similarities in how funding 
agencies set up contracts and attempt to monitor 
them. He confirms that funding agencies play a cru-
cial role in “mediating” the harsh exigencies in the 
principal–agent relationship between politics and 
science. It turns out that the contracts are rarely 
monitored and that scientists have a considerable 
freedom to deal with these contracts. 
On the other hand, one finds almost no ‘shirking’ 
by scientists, meaning there is seldom abuse of this 
freedom. This also confirms the interdependent rela-
tionship between funding agencies and scientists: 
above all, Caswill highlights, the scientific staff in 
funding agencies has an intrinsic interest in granting 
scientists sufficient freedom for action. Scientists, on 
the other hand, have an interest in complying with 
the funding agency to be sure of future resources. 
Both Guston and Morris attempt to turn the usual 
top-down perspective of the principal–agent discus-
sion around and take in a bottom-up perspective. 
Guston analyses scientific advice as a form of 
“science in policy”. In fact, one of the main prob-
lems for policy-makers is to know, given the often 
contradictory or competing advice different scien-
tists may give, which advice to trust. This is, indeed, 
the problem of “adverse selection”, which has rarely 
been treated in the context of science policy. He 
demonstrates that mediation and procedures as well 
as the creation of market-regulating mechanisms can 
be an effective way to overcome this problem. 
Guston’s study is, therefore, very much a debate on 
the “institutional design” of effective policy-making, 
only this time seen in the context of policy-
formulation. He points to the fact that principal–
agent is not a complete theory for scientific advice 
as such, but that it is very helpful in understanding 
The articles presented here 
demonstrate the attempt to broaden 
the field of application of principal–
agent theory in science policy studies 
and brighten the interesting light this 
perspective can throw on the choices 
and procedures of science policy actors
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the choices and procedures of organising the use of 
reliable knowledge in policy contexts. 
Morris looks at the scientists, the agents in princi-
pal–agent theory, and wonders in what way they 
really behave as agents and how they experience the 
relationship with policy-makers as principals. By 
highlighting several “contextual features” of the sci-
entific system, she is able to demonstrate that these 
features mitigate the sharp edges of the principal–
agent relationship. Because of these features — 
among them, again, is the role of funding agencies 
— scientists have more freedom than we might ex-
pect, there are fewer conflicts between scientists and 
policy-makers, and accountability is less demanding 
than we might believe. These structural features al-
low scientists to do their work without feeling that 
they are merely agents. 
Shove, finally, is the most critical with respect to 
principal–agent theory, because the experience with 
several research programmes has demonstrated that 
the means of principals’ influence over scientists 
through research programmes is extremely limited. 
Rather, one finds an “anarchic structuring of the 
field”. Shove conceptualises research programmes 
as the relationship among the funding agency, pro-
gramme directors, and scientists as multiple agents. 
Neither funding agencies nor programme directors 
are able to inhibit the development of a dynamic of 
research programmes where scientists use these pro-
grammes for their own purposes, build up networks, 
and participate in a multitude of different pro-
grammes. These programmes are for her not agents, 
as she has presumed in the beginning, but they be-
come their own actors. Principal–agent theory can-
not, according to Shove, understand this turnaround 
and the dynamics that emerge within these  
programmes. 
This overview not only demonstrates the attempt 
of the authors to combine theoretical rigour and 
‘requisite variety’ but also the extension of topics to 
which principal–agent theory has been applied in 
science policy, though Shove sees some limitations 
in the approach. We could, however, question this 
conclusion, if we understand the relationship be-
tween programme directors and scientists as a rela-
tionship between a principal and multiple agents, 
and we use existing knowledge from the approach 
that underlines that such a constellation is only fruit-
ful for the principal if the agents are in a competitive 
position. If, as is the case here, these agents play a 
co-operative game, it is not surprising that unique 
dynamics set in, and these agents use the opportunity 
structure of a research programme for their own 
purposes. 
The articles in this special issue not only present 
the variety of topics that can be dealt with in terms 
of principal–agent theory, but they furnish also im-
portant insights such as: 
• the importance of contextual features of the sys-
tem that mitigate principal–agent relationships; 
• the crucial role of funding agencies among these 
contextual features; 
• the role of networks as a new way to organise 
principal–agent relations; 
• the pertinence of the inclusion of users as the 
‘fourth actor’; 
• the conceptualisation of science policy in terms of 
configuration and not isolated bivariate principal–
agent relationships; and 
• the usefulness of institutional design in the org-
anisation of science policy. 
We, therefore, are convinced of the usefulness of the 
approach and would invite other scholars to embark 
on this quest for a more analytical and rigorous tool 
in observing science policy. 
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